In PS v Ontario, a five Justice panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down the wording of the province's Mental Health Act that authorized the involuntary committal of psychiatric patients for a period exceeding six months. This extraordinary order sought to remedy the fundamental injustice of not providing tribunal review of treatment and discharge planning decisions for long-term patients. The authors explore how the judgment can invigorate the important liberty interests at stake in civil commitment, and bridge the gap that has grown between civil and forensic mental health law. As the flaws identified by the Ontario Court appear in legislation across Canada, the article considers the implications for all common law jurisdictions.
Introduction
Civil commitment regimes in every province and territory in Canada allow the state to detain individuals with a mental illness without their consent, usually on the basis that that individual presents a threat to themselves or to others, or is at risk of serious physical or mental deterioration.
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renewable period of detention, no jurisdiction has imposed a limit on the overall length of time an individual may be detained. Every province and territory has a tribunal to which a civilly committed individual may apply to have his or her detention reviewed. 2 Civil commitment has been described as "the most significant deprivation of liberty without judicial process that is sanctioned by our society." 3 Some advocates hoped that the There are three aspects of the civil commitment process that attract Charter scrutiny.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
First, the Charter has been used to challenge the criteria by which the commitment decision is made, usually by physicians. With one notable exception, judges have shown deference to legislators and to physicians in assessing the criteria for civil commitment. 6 Second, the Charter can be used to challenge the statutory regime for nonconsensual treatment that may accompany civil commitment depending on the particular legislative regime in force in the province. 7 Finally, the procedures and powers of the review tribunal that exists in almost every jurisdiction to review civil commitment may be subject to a Charter challenge. It is this last stage that is the focus of this paper. , was an early exception to this where the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that committal criteria failed to sufficiently define the persons who could be subject to committal and the circumstances under which they could be compulsorily detained. The standard at issue in Thwaites was extremely all-encompassing as the legislation provided that a person could be admitted as a compulsory patient if a qualified medical practitioner thought the person "should be admitted as a patient at a psychiatric facility". After the Thwaites decision, the government responded by amending the legislation to provide for an objective "dangerousness" test to be met prior to certifying involuntary admission. The legislation also provided a more specific definition of "mental disorder" and "mental retardation". This amended legislation was upheld in 
The Ontario Court of Appeal
With respect to the section 7 issue, the Court of Appeal began by making a distinction between those individuals who are civilly committed for less than six months (roughly 98%), and those who are civilly committed for more than six months (roughly 2%). 37 Relying on these statistics, the Court held that the focus of the CCB is on short-term committal and whether the patient meets the criteria for commitment. 38 However, when that commitment extends beyond six months, the Charter requires that the Board have additional powers to deal with those commitments.
39
The In sum, the case law suggests that in the non-punitive detention context, s. 7 requires the body reviewing detention to have the procedures and powers necessary to render a decision that is minimally restrictive on liberty in light of the circumstances necessitating the detention. to order that the individual be transferred to a different level of security within a detaining institution, to transfer the individual to another hospital with conditions, or to increase access to the community or order conditions to prepare for gradual release. 45 The Mental Health Act must provide the Board with sufficient flexibility to ensure that individuals are not subjected to overly restrictive or prolonged detentions and to make sure that the individual's treatment is moving them towards reintegration into society. The Court of Appeal envisaged a review mechanism that would allow the Board to examine basic questions as to "where and how a person is detained and how they are discharged into the community." 46 One example of the inadequacy of the Board's powers was the fact that the Mental Health Act did not give the CCB the power to issue a community treatment order as an alternative to detention for an individual certified as an
The Court crafted a simple but elegant remedy in this case, pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Rather than invalidating the civil commitment regime, it focused on the provisions that provided for renewals beyond six months. By severing the words "or subsequent", renewals beyond six months are disallowed. 48 Section 20(4) provided as follows:
An involuntary patient may be detained, restrained, observed and examined in a psychiatric facility, (a) for not more than two weeks under a certificate of involuntary admission; and (b) for not more than, (i) one additional month under a first certificate of renewal, (ii) two additional months under a second certificate of renewal, and 45 Ibid at para 126. 46 Ibid at para 127. 47 Ibid at para 127. As will be discussed below this is one deficiency identified by the Court of Appeal that was not addressed in the Ontario government's amendments. See Part III B, below. 48 Ibid at para 202.
(iii) three additional months under a third or subsequent certificate of renewal,…
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Because the Board only had jurisdiction to order a transfer after approximately 9 months, the Court held that the transfer provision would no longer be applicable because individuals could not be committed for nine months. The Court left for another day whether problems of the kind encountered in this case could arise in short-term civil commitment. 50 The Court suspended the operation of its remedy for a period of 12 months so that the Ontario government could consider how to review its legislative regime. I note here that s. 15(1) does not require "24/7" interpretation services for all aspects of daily living, but in the context of involuntary detention, it certainly does require a degree of accommodation beyond the context of significant therapeutic services and interactions. In Eldridge, the court held, at para. 82, that the "'effective communication' standard is a flexible one, and will take into consideration such factors as the complexity and importance of the information to be communicated, the context in which the communications will take place and the number of people involved." The means for effective communication does not have to be provided at all times and in every situation.
However, statutorily-mandated detention renders detainees entirely dependent upon the hospital, whether privately or publicly operated, for essential services and treatment. In my view, in the context of detention, the flexible Eldridge standard of "effective communication" mandates the regular provision of communication through deaf 49 The Court apparently overlooked the fact that the remedy ordered here actually allows for commitment beyond six months since there is the initial two weeks, followed by one month, an additional two months, and finally three more months which makes for a total of six months and two weeks. 50 PS, supra note 8 at para 204. 51 Ibid at para 206. 52 Ibid at paras 147-148. appropriate services in order to ensure that the detainees' basic and fundamental personal needs are being fully understood and consistently addressed.
The Court went on to say that the applications judge had erred by finding violations of PS's section 15 rights only on isolated occasions, in the face of evidence that hospital authorities had relied for years on written communication with PS despite being aware that he was functionally illiterate and required ASL interpretation for comprehension. The Court made a particular point of noting the importance of using interpreters for effective communication of requests for consent to treatment, something the facilities had consistently failed to do.
With respect to its ruling that PS's equality rights had been consistently and unjustifiably violated over a period of years, the Court made an order for declaratory relief as follows, pursuant to the remedial power in section 24(1) of the Charter: 53 (1) that the appellant's s. 15(1) rights have been violated, and (2) setting out in general terms the nature and extent of his entitlement under s. 15(1), namely, that Ontario and Waypoint are required to provide the necessary and appropriate communication services that will ensure: (i) that the appellant's basic and fundamental personal needs as a detainee are fully understood and addressed, and (ii) that the appellant is able to communicate effectively to access the therapeutic, treatment and other programs offered to hearing detainees.
PS represents the most fulsome elaboration by a Canadian appellate court of the Eldridge principles with respect to access to equal public services by deaf persons, and indeed by persons with disabilities generally.
E. National Significance of PS v Ontario
Given that PS has binding force only in Ontario, why should academics and lawyers outside Ontario still take heed of this important decision? While the mental health regime in
Ontario is unique, features of Ontario's legislation germane to the reasoning in PS are common to most provincial and territorial mental health statutes. 54 In other words, the shortcomings identified by the Ontario Court of Appeal in PS exist across the country. Every province and territory provides for civil commitment which can last longer than six months. 55 For example, in British Columbia, an individual can be detained for one month, renewed for a second month, then three months followed by an unlimited number of six-month renewals. 56 Nova Scotia is similar except no single renewal is for more than three months. 57 None of these jurisdictions puts a limit on how long a person can be detained. Some provinces provide a role for the tribunal in reviewing treatment decisions 58 while others limit their review tribunals to reviewing the status of civil commitment and release. 59 In British Columbia, for example, the civil review tribunal only has the jurisdiction to review detention, although this extends to those on extended leave.
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Unlike in Ontario, the BC statute gives the review panel no jurisdiction whatsoever regarding treatment which, for those with involuntary status, can be imposed without consent. 61 Further, no provincial mental health legislation in Canada provides the kind of jurisdiction envisaged by the 54 We confine our general remarks to Canada's common law jurisdictions. Mental health law in Quebec has distinct features owing both to its civil law system and the role of an omnibus administrative tribunal, the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec. Civil mental health law in Quebec is governed by provisions of that province's Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Protection Act, supra note 1. Beyond an initial 72 hour period of hospital confinement, a person is subject to involuntary admission only by virtue of a court order, and for a period specified by the court (subject to renewal). The individual may seek a review of the order of confinement before the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec (the "ATQ"), the tribunal that conducts administrative reviews across many areas of public governance in Quebec. The ATQ also acts as the forensic review board in Quebec for purposes of Part XX. freedom of movement within the facility and its surrounding community, and the power to scrutinize treatment plans to ensure that the individual is making progress towards reintegration into the community. PS provides important ammunition for challenging all these shortcomings in provincial and territorial regimes.
III. Commentary
In this commentary, we wish to outline the significance of the ruling in PS for enhanced administrative supervision of the civil mental health system in Ontario, and for the systems in all common law provinces. We focus on the systemic section 7 issue, rather than on the individualized section 15 claim which was unique to PS.
We begin by demonstrating that the most significant aspect of the Court's decision was its reliance on the Criminal Code Review Board jurisprudence. We then move on to examine the response to PS recently enacted by the Ontario government and demonstrate that, while the changes are progressive and important for long-term detainees, the response stops short of fully vindicating section 7 liberty interests and may even raise its own section 15 concerns for persons civilly committed for shorter periods of time. Finally, we speculate on a broader role for administrative tribunals in the mental health field generated by the Court of Appeal's reasoning. who are sick. The analogy to criminal law procedural protections was not relevant to the civil commitment context because of these different rationales:
It is necessary at this point to repeat what I said earlier concerning the use of criminal cases to decide a mental health matter: the objects and purposes of criminal law and mental health legislation are so different that cases in one area will be of little guidance in the other. A protective statute and a penal statute operate in dramatically dissimilar contexts. Strict and narrow criteria for the detention of persons in a criminal law context reflect our society's notions of fundamental justice for an accused person and protection of the public is a foremost consideration. But in the field of mental health, the same criteria would defeat the purpose of the legislation which is to help seriously mentally ill people in need of protection.
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The Court failed to recognize that even a statue with a "protective" purpose can have the same effect on the individual as a punitive statute and thus should trigger the same liberty interests. found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder ("NCR patient").
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Criminal Code Review Boards regularly assess the levels of custody in which an individual is detained and the level of privileges an individual is allowed to experience. By contrast, civil tribunals rarely have any jurisdiction to assess whether the hospitalization is doing anything positive for the individual or moving him or her closer to discharge. PS provided a stark demonstration of the impact of the lack of a similar jurisdiction on the civil mental health side in Ontario. Year after year the CCB told the medical staff that PS did not need maximum
security and yet year after year he continued to be detained, untreated, in maximum security: an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that the CCB was powerless to address. It took a case about psychiatric gating, arising out of the criminal justice system, to get the Court to explicitly acknowledge the connection between coercive deprivations of liberty in the criminal system and coercive deprivations of liberty through civil commitment.
The Criminal Code Review Board's powers with respect to scrutinizing treatment decisions are not explicitly given to the Review Board in the Criminal Code, but rather are inferred from the Board's broad jurisdiction to make decisions about the risk the accused presents to the community and to reintegrate the accused. 76 The supervisory power given to the Review Board was not inevitable but rather the result of deliberate choices by the courts. For 75 Ibid at para 84 (per Abella J). Note that in Conway, the Supreme Court ruled that even though the Ontario Review Board had Charter jurisdiction and was a "court of competent jurisdiction" for purposes of section 24(1), its remedial authority under that provision was limited to the orders it was authorized to make by its parent statute, i.e., the Criminal Code. This is a further limitation on the scope of tribunal jurisdiction in Charter matters that complicates the field. 76 It is important to acknowledge that Parliament has made significant revisions to the disposition provisions that are applied by the Criminal Code Review Board, most significantly removing the requirements that the board impose the least restrictive option when imposing a disposition. Now the board is instructed to give priority to the safety of the public and the accused's liberty interest has been given less weight. This is particularly problematic given the certificate of continuation or renewal, the person concerned or someone on his or her behalf can apply to the CCB for an inquiry as to whether committal criteria continue to be met. As with certificates of renewal, the Board may rescind a certificate of continuation should it find that committal criteria are not met. 83 The statute also provides that an application for review shall be deemed to be made by a patient on the completion of a first certificate of continuation, and every fourth such certificate thereafter. 1. Transfer the patient to another psychiatric facility,… but only if the patient does not object. 2. Place the patient on a leave of absence for a designated period on the advice of a physician … 3. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to provide the patient with a different security level or different privileges within or outside the psychiatric facility. 4. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to allow the patient to be provided with supervised or unsupervised access to the community. 5. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to provide the patient with vocational, interpretation or rehabilitative services.
The Board may make any or all of these five orders on its own motion, even where not requested to do so, but is expressly barred from making any other order. Section 42 (2) lists the parties to a hearing on a certificate of continuation, including the Minister should he or she wish to appear, and parties may seek a variance of the Board's orders during a continuation period on the basis of a change "in material circumstances."
Barring such a change, a patient is limited to making only one application under section 41.1(2) every 12 months.
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The CCB is required to impose the order that is the least restrictive given the circumstances justifying detention. 87 Apart from this statement, however, the amendments reflect a remarkable caution about trusting the CCB to exercise its new discretionary powers in a responsible fashion. The CCB must consider the safety of the public, the ability of the facility to 85 Ibid, s 41.1(2). 86 Ibid, s 39(7). 87 Ibid, s 41.1(3). This is particularly striking given that the The officer in charge of the facility is given the authority to act contrary to an order of the CCB if there is a risk of serious bodily harm to the individual or anyone else 90 although this power is temporary and the officer in charge must apply to the CCB within seven days to cancel or vary its order Ontario has not given its tribunal the power to issue a community treatment order as an alternative to detention, a power specifically found to be lacking by the PS Court.
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Assessing Ontario's Response
In our view, the amendments meet in a narrow fashion the constitutional problems identified by the Court with respect to section 7 of the Charter. The Legislature has granted authority to the CCB that gives it a form of supervisory role in treatment planning for long-term patients. In so doing, Ontario has further distinguished its mental health legislation from that of other provinces in the area of protection of patients' rights. Ontario stands out as a leader when it comes to protecting the liberty interests of long-term detainees. However, the amendments are couched in terms that limit the positive impact they might otherwise have. We have two primary concerns. First, the government has failed to address the fact that the line between involuntary and voluntary "patients" is not always a clear one and manipulation of this distinction could 88 Ibid, s 41.1(4). 89 Ibid, s 41.1(8). 90 Ibid, s 41.2(1). 91 PS, supra note 8 at para 127.
undermine the new protections granted. Second, we have serious concerns about limiting the scope of procedural protections to those who are detained for longer than six months.
It is widely believed by mental health law advocates that there is considerable manipulation of an individual's status as a voluntary or involuntary "patient" in psychiatric facilities. Decertifying an individual may be a technique used to render a legal dispute moot and, in the context of these new provisions, could potentially be used to deny access to the enhanced powers of the CCB that accompany a certificate of continuation. In PS specifically, the applicant lost his access to the CCB because he was decertified and made "voluntary" even though he was While the PS Court indicated that this was not an appropriate way to respond to PS, there is nothing in the statute that prevents such status changes. Given that any one individual may go back and forth between the two different statuses, it would be desirable to have some mechanism to review the circumstances of anyone who has been hospitalized for more than six months, regardless of their status. 93 Given that the incidence of long-term psychiatric hospitalizations has decreased significantly in recent decades, the safeguard should not be prohibitively expensive.
While Ontario has improved the plight of long-term detainees, it has not closed the door to further litigation on the procedures for review of civil commitments of less than six months.
In our view, limiting amendments to long-term involuntary commitment will only create uncertainty and put an undue onus on persons who are civilly committed for shorter periods of time to litigate the scope of their liberty and security interests. The Court's use of a six-month cutoff period (or to put it another way, its restricting the ruling to "long-term committals" defined as 6 months) is open to criticism as arbitrary. The Court arrived at this time period through analyzing statistics, which demonstrated that 98% of patients are released before six months and only 2% are detained beyond six months. 94 The Ontario government's response draws a clear line at the six-month cutoff. However, it is not entirely clear why these percentages are relevant to the cut off point for protecting the liberty interests of an individual.
The fact that only a small number of people are detained beyond six months has no coherent connection to the liberty interests of the majority released before six months. Would it be appropriate to detain an individual in maximum security where he or she does not need that level of custody for five months, or even one month? Is it acceptable to deny civilly committed 93 In the committee hearings about Bill 122, advocacy groups expressed concern about individuals who are being held "voluntarily" yet who face the threat of civil commitment. persons appropriate treatment tailored to their disability for three months? When one considers the revolving door syndrome, and the fact that people who are detained for short periods may well be readmitted subsequently, many individuals may spend long periods of time civilly committed without any effective mechanism of review of the conditions of that detention. 95 The
Court leaves these questions for another day given that PS had been detained for 19 years.
However the Court's rationale applies just as persuasively to review tribunals that are considering shorter-term commitments and reviewing patients who are on extended leave or released on CTO's. We can think of no other context where deprivations of liberty are allowed to continue unchecked for up to six months before a full panoply of section 7 rights take effect.
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While the PS Court recognized that by limiting its analysis to long-term detention, it opened the door to future challenges about whether the failure to have an administrative tribunal with a broad-based supervisory role is constitutional for shorter periods of commitment. There are two arguments against extending the CCB jurisdiction to all civil commitments. First, because the numbers of short-term commitments is much larger, the cost would correspondingly increase.
We do not feel this is an acceptable reason for denying the vindication of section 7 rights. The second argument against extending jurisdiction to this group of individuals is that it might 95 We note here the more robust view of the Supreme Court of Canada when describing the appropriate supervisory role of a Nova Scotia Provincial Court judge in the context of the continuing supervision of a "protection order" for a vulnerable adult, authorized by that province's Adult Protection Act RSNS 1989, c. 2:
The significance of independent judicial review of state action when a vulnerable adult has been deprived, at the instigation of the state, of the right to function autonomously, cannot be overstated. The court's statutorily assigned supervisory role emerges from the adult's vulnerability. The corollary of a judicial determination that an adult is in need of protection is a corresponding limitation on that adult's autonomous decision making and liberty. It is the function of the court to monitor the scope of that limitation. The legislation must, therefore, be interpreted in a way which acknowledges the intrusiveness of the determination and offers muscular protection from state intervention incompatible with the adult's welfare. unduly interfere with treatment goals of the treating physician for shorter-term commitments.
We believe this problem can be minimized by, for example, limiting the number of times an individual could access the extended powers of the CCB, just as Ontario has already done for long-term commitments.
Given that the distinction between those detained longer than six months and those detained for shorter periods is somewhat arbitrary, we are also concerned that in limiting its solution to long-term detainees, Ontario may have exposed it statute to possible challenge under section 15 of the Charter, the equality rights provision. Ontario's decision to establish a new set of powers for the CCB with respect to individuals subject to continuation certificates creates a "benefit" or, more aptly, a "protection of the law" that is denied to those on shorter periods of commitment. This statutory distinction arguably discriminates on grounds of disability in violation of section 15(1) of the Charter. This is ironic given the strong equality rights thrust that underpinned the facts in PS, and that was vindicated in the Court of Appeal's striking judgment on the section 15(1) issue. The equality rights issue as it concerns long-term and shortterm commitments is of a different nature. Whereas the issue in an Eldridge-type case deals with the failure of public authorities to accommodate the needs of a disadvantaged group in order for them to participate in equal benefit and protection of the law-what is often referred to as "adverse effect discrimination"-the limiting of access to the new powers of the CCB to longterm commitments is more an instance of "direct discrimination." The distinction in law is clear on the face of the statute, and is drawn between different groups of persons with mental disabilities, based on legal status while hospitalized and length of stay in a psychiatric facility.
Jurisprudence on section 15(1) is clear that discrimination claims can be based on differential treatment in law between sub-groups sharing the same overall enumerated or analogous characteristic. 97 The more difficult question in a section 15(1) challenge to the denial of access to the protections afforded by section 41.1(2) of the Act would be whether the distinction is discriminatory in the sense of compounding disadvantages experienced by that person, through prejudice, stereotyping or otherwise. 98 While the government would presumably argue that the additional protections afforded to those subject to continuation certificates correspond to a need for enhanced supervision of treatment planning past the point of diagnosis and early application of therapeutic interventions, this position might be less persuasive with respect to individuals with a history of frequent or multiple recent involuntary committals. This is especially true when considering the newly added power of the CCB to order the director of a facility to provide a person with "vocational, interpretation or rehabilitative services." It should be noted that this power speaks most directly to the equality rights interest raised by the PS case, and can be seen as a means of ensuring that those interests must not be neglected. The fact that these protections are needed for long-term commitments does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that they are unnecessary for commitments of less than six months.
This discussion of the equality problem in the amended Ontario legislation is not intended to suggest that a section 15 challenge to this otherwise important reform legislation is imminent or would be straightforward. But nor can the government rely on the PS decision to insulate its distinction between short and long-term commitments. The Ontario Court of Appeal does not mandate such a distinction in its decision. Rather, it was confronted by a man who had been civilly committed for 19 years and did not need to address short-term commitments. It thus limited its judgment based on the six-month cutoff period. It explicitly leaves open the possibility that further protections are necessary for short-term commitments. It held that longerterm commitments require more, it did not hold that short-term commitments do not.
IV. Moving Beyond PS
A. Restraint and Seclusion Within Psychiatric Facilities
The conclusion in PS that long-term civil commitment requires tribunal review of treatment and discharge planning implicitly raises the question of whether there are other section 7 liberty interests in civil commitment that call for enhanced administrative oversight and review. In our view, there is at least one other area that comes distinctly within the ambit, that of the use of treatment. 101 The Special Rapporteur also notes that there can be no therapeutic justification for the prolonged use of restraints.
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The use of restraint and seclusion in psychiatric hospital facilities is a well-known phenomenon. The measures continue to be used in Canadian psychiatric facilities, including in
Ontario. 103 While subject to government and hospital policies and protocols, concerns have long been expressed that the mechanisms for enforcing compliance with policies are informal and uneven. 104 If additional powers are to be given to mental health tribunals, it would seem appropriate to include the ability to review and report on, and direct changes with respect to the use of these highly invasive, and largely unreviewable, measures.
B. Charter Jurisdiction of Mental Health Tribunals
The discussion of restraint and seclusion leads to an issue that was raised before the issues of law. 108 That presumption could be rebutted by express legislative withdrawal of Charter jurisdiction, or by a clear implication of such intent derived from statutory limits on a tribunal's role and logistical functioning. 109 The legislatures of Alberta and British Columbia have enacted blanket provisions withdrawing Charter jurisdiction for most tribunals within their jurisdiction, including civil mental health tribunals. 110 Ontario has also withdrawn Charter jurisdiction from the CCB with respect to civil commitment and CTO reviews. 111 It would appear then that these tribunals are precluded from having the power to order section 24 (1) remedies so long as the legislature maintains its prohibition. 112 However, there is an issue as to whether this denial of Charter jurisdiction to civil mental health tribunals is constitutional, and therefore whether a challenge to that statutory withdrawal could instead provide tribunals with section 24(1) jurisdiction.
In Martin, the Supreme Court of Canada based its finding of a rebuttable presumption that tribunals with jurisdiction generally over issues of law have Charter jurisdiction on the logic of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 52(1) states that any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid and of no force or effect. The Court stated that this means that statutory decision-makers who have the authority to interpret and apply law must refuse to enforce a law they deem unconstitutional. This is inconsistent with the idea that legislators have carte blanche to decide whether any particular tribunal has Charter jurisdiction (or constitutional jurisdiction generally), irrespective of the tribunal's place in the legal system, its importance with respect to access to justice, and the breadth of its role in interpreting law.
Justice Gonthier, writing for the Court in Martin, appeared to acknowledge this problem in the following passage:
I refrain, however, from expressing any opinion as to the constitutionality of a provision that would place procedural barriers in the way of claimants seeking to assert their rights in a timely and effective manner, for instance by removing Charter jurisdiction from a tribunal without providing an effective alternative administrative route for Charter claims.
113
The reference to an "effective alternative administrative route" appears not to include recourse to superior courts on constitutional matters, which is otherwise always available. As noted by
Justice Sharpe in PS, individuals detained in psychiatric facilities face particular challenges in asserting their rights and in accessing the courts.
In a second and related submission, Ontario argues that where a patient wishes to challenge a committal on grounds that fall outside the powers of the CCB, there are alternate procedures available to fill any perceived gap. The patient can initiate proceedings in the Superior Court, resort to internal complaint procedures within the hospital, complain about doctors and nurses to the appropriate professional colleges or invoke the process established by the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, with respect to complaints about a failure to accommodate a disability.
If we were to accept this submission, the appellant, a person who suffers from a mental disorder and a serious disability and who is held in a maximum security institution, would have to initiate proceedings in two or more different tribunals. This solution is fatally flawed; it is legally inadequate and practically unworkable. It would be prohibitively costly, very slow, seriously inconvenient and almost certainly ineffective.
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While Justice Sharpe was directing his comments to the absence of an administrative mechanism to raise issues related to overall treatment planning, access to a forum to pursue Charter rights 113 Martin, supra note 98 at para 44. 114 PS, supra note 8 at paras 118-119.
encounters the same barriers for individuals confined in a psychiatric facility. A constitutional challenge might well be available with respect to the denial of Charter jurisdiction to mental health tribunals, or to any other administrative agency with supervisory authority over psychiatric facilities, if those entities do not provide "effective alternative administrative" routes.
The arena in which these tribunals and agencies operate is one in which Charter rights, particularly section 7 rights, are implicated on a regular basis. The populations whose rights are at risk of infringement are particularly vulnerable, and have limited means to access other avenues for recourse as well as legal counsel. Therefore, it might be that the CCB and other review tribunals are precisely the kind of entities that should be able to rule on and remediate individual Charter breaches.
V. Conclusion
The decision in PS has the potential to prompt amendments to civil commitment statutes across Canada since no mental health statute currently meets the criteria that the Court of Appeal has prescribed. We would hope that provincial legislatures would treat this decision as a message that it is time to move towards treating civilly committed individuals as rights holders, entitled to the same procedural protections as other individuals detained by the state. However, if past experience is any indication, doing nothing is the most likely response by most provincial legislators, as the rights of civilly detained individuals have never been given priority. Failure to respond proactively to PS would put the onus on those detained in psychiatric facilities to initiate
Charter challenges to bring about reform. There has been a dearth of litigation regarding mental health tribunals outside of Ontario. Even the refusal to allow competent civilly committed individuals to decline treatment in British Columbia and Newfoundland, a denial that raises serious Charter concerns 115 have not yet been subject to a Charter challenge despite the compelling reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Fleming v Reid. 116 There are huge institutional barriers to having these matters litigated, not the least of which is a profound lack of funding as well as difficulties with mootness where potential plaintiffs are decertified or released before their cases are heard by a court.
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As a result of the PS decision, the legislative scheme for long-term detainees in Ontario has changed for the better. However, the government chose reforms that would give rights to the 
